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Abstract 
 
Uruguay is a small economy. Its integration into MERCOSUR has increased its exposure to 
regional macroeconomic instability. The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of regional 
integration on the country’s labour market and poverty. We estimated wage differentials 
between labour categories, finding a 60 percent wage gap between formal and informal 
workers. A CGE model with an efficiency wage specification for unskilled labour was built, 
with results showing that regional shocks deeply affect the Uruguayan economy. The 
consideration of an efficiency wage model is particularly important when shocks lead to a 
reallocation of resources towards sectors intensive in unskilled labour. A subsidy on formal, 
unskilled labour could contribute to decrease informality and therefore increase GDP, but 
this type of policy needs to be carefully implemented because it may have negative effects 
on investment. Finally, the effects on poverty and income distribution obtained through 
microsimulations are consistent with the results of the CGE experiments.  
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Introduction 
 
In the nineties, with the signing of the MERCOSUR agreement, Uruguay deepened its 
economic integration within the region and hastened the country’s trade liberalization 
process. As a result, trade within MERCOSUR increased significantly but also increased 
with the rest of the world. Trade openness led to resource reallocation from the 
manufacturing sector towards services, profoundly affecting labour market structure. The 
regional economic crisis that started with the Brazilian currency devaluation in 1999 led to a 
four-year economic recession, worsening labour market and poverty indicators.  
 
The purpose of this study is to find out how the labour market is affected by external shocks, 
particularly those associated with the integration process or by changes in trade policies of 
the bloc. It intends to estimate the effects on specialization, trade, employment and wages 
stemming from those shocks or from changes in trade policies, taking into account the 
imperfections and specific features of the labour market in different sectors of the Uruguayan 
economy. It also identifies the impacts of these policy changes on poverty and income 
distribution. Finally, the study evaluates policy options to lower the costs associated with this 
process, directed to improve employment.  
 
The study began with a review of the main characteristics of the Uruguayan labour market 
and an estimation of wage differentials between sectors and labour categories in order to 
obtain the stylised facts to be considered in the model. A CGE model was then built with the 
purpose of running different scenarios of regional shocks, and trade and labour market 
policies. Finally, microsimulations were run in order to evaluate the impact of these shocks 
on poverty and income distribution.  
 
In Section 2 a brief overview of the Uruguayan economy is presented and the main features 
of the labour market are analysed, indicating the existence of imperfections that should be 
taken into account for the specification of the CGE model used in the analysis. 
 
Section 3 describes the main characteristics of the CGE model, the calibration and the 
design of simulations carried out. It also presents the main aspects of the microsimulations 
methodology that was adopted to analyse the impact on poverty and income distribution. 
 
Section 4 presents the results obtained and, finally, Section 5 the main conclusions.   2
Economic overview 
 
Recent economic performance 
 
During the last 25 years Uruguay gradually adopted several reforms focused on the 
liberalization and opening of real and financial flows in order to increase Uruguay’s ties with 
the world economy, achieve macroeconomic stability and set the market as the main 
mechanism for resource allocation. The process started in the mid-seventies, with great 
transformations in the financial sector but only minor progress in terms of openness to trade. 
By the end of the 70s, financial flows were completely liberalized, while trade reforms were 
carried out more gradually. Starting from a maximum of 150 percent in 1980, by January 
1993 the highest tariff was set at 20 percent.  
The 1990s were dominated by the creation of the MERCOSUR, an imperfect customs union 
among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The creation of the MERCOSUR implied 
the existence of free trade within the bloc and the adoption of a common external tariff 
(CET), which was agreed in 1994 and enforced in 1995. The adopted CET varied from 0 to 
20 percent, with an average tariff of 11 percent. However, many exceptions to its application 
were accepted, and presently the four countries still apply different external tariffs to some 
goods, mainly capital goods and computing and telecommunication goods. The full 
enforcement of the CET by 2010 will mean that Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay would 
have to increase their tariffs on these goods, an unwelcome development since these 
countries believe that such will hinder competitiveness in most sectors. 
 
Since the creation of the MERCOSUR Uruguayan exports improved their access to a very 
large market (the sum of Argentina and Brazil). Trade within MERCOSUR increased 
significantly, and by 1998, 55 percent of Uruguay’s goods were destined for the bloc. This 
was, in part, because of MERCOSUR, but this was also due to the loss of competitiveness 
of Uruguayan exports to third countries. The latter was a result of an overvalued local 
currency, the consequence of a policy of price stabilization based on the exchange rate. 
Since similar stabilization policies were adopted in Brazil and Argentina, exports to those 
countries remained competitive.  
 
The situation changed dramatically when the Brazilian currency started to float in January 
1999, affecting Uruguayan exports directly and indirectly (through the Brazilian impact on   3
Argentina). The share of Uruguayan goods exported to Brazil declined from more than a 
third in 1998 to a little more than 20 percent in 2001. In 2002, the financial crisis in Argentina 
also affected the Uruguayan economy. The reduction of Argentine income levels, the 
restrictions on credit access, and the change in relative prices in that country had a negative 
impact on Uruguay’s trade outflows. The total service exports (tourism basically) fell more 
than 35 percent in the first quarter of 2002 compared to the same period in 2001 (that year, 
80 percent of the tourists were Argentines). Exports of goods to Argentina dropped about 70 
percent in the first semester of 2002 relative to the first semester of the previous year.  
 
The Argentine crisis had relevant effects on financial activity as well. By 2001, the share of 
deposit stock of non-residents from Argentina was high, but in February 2002 Uruguay 
experienced an important capital flight due to the withdrawal of non-resident deposits. The 
critical situation worsened by fraud in three of the main private Uruguayan banks. By August, 
the deposit stock in the Uruguayan banking system had been reduced by 50 percent relative 
to the beginning of the year, which forced the abandonment of the exchange rate system in 
June 2002. A floating exchange rate was adopted, leading to a significant depreciation of the 
local currency. The exchange rate accumulated a total 106 percent increase from December 
2001 to December 2002.  
 
Towards the end of July 2002, given the international reserves loss due to capital flight, the 
Uruguayan government decided to call a “banking holiday” in order to make significant 
changes in the banking system. The restructuring entailed the compulsory reprogramming of 
term deposits in state-owned banks and the closure of four insolvent private banks (with a 
very large market-share). After the restructuring, the branches of international banks 
increased their importance in the banking system. This new financial situation implied severe 
restrictions on bank credit access, which did not affect uniformly across sectors. 
 
Although in the long run the Uruguayan economy shows a poor performance, e.g. the 
average increase of GDP was 1.9 percent between 1970 and 1990, the 1990s were a period 
of economic growth. Between 1990 and 1998 GDP increased by an annual rate higher than 
4 percent (see Table 1). However, by the end of 1998 this process began to reverse itself 
and after the Brazilian currency devaluation of January 1999 the country was in complete 
recession. In 2003 economic recovery started in Uruguay, mainly driven by exports, which 
grew 18 percent. Uruguayan exports had an 80 percent competitiveness gain in relation to   4
Brazil and other trade partners as a result of the depreciation of the Uruguayan currency. 


























1990   0,3  112,5  -3,0  2,0 18,10 23,53 12,20  8,5
1991   3,5  102,0  -1,8  0,7 17,86 20,69 15,13  8,9
1992   7,9  68,5  0,3  -0,8 19,63 20,45 15,38  9,0
1993   2,7  54,1  -1,7  -1,8 19,56 19,13 15,64  8,3
1994   7,3  44,7  -2,8  -2,3 20,38 19,77 15,87  9,2
1995   -1,4  42,2  -1,5  -1,3 19,10 19,00 15,41  10,3
1996   5,6  28,3  -1,4 -1,2 19,86 19,67 15,24  11,9
1997 5,0  19,8 -1,4 -1,1 20,54 20,55 15,22  11,4
1998 4,5  10,8 -0,9 -1,8 20,58 19,85 15,87  10,1
1999 -2,8  5,7  -4,0 -2,3 19,30 18,03 15,14 11,3
2000 -1,4  4,8  -4,0 -2,8 20,98 19,30 13,96 13,6
2001 -3,4  3,6  -4,3 -2,6 20,04 18,35 13,77 15,3
2002 -11,0  25,9  -4,2   3,1 20,01 21,97 11,52  16,9
2003 2,2  10,2 -3,2   -0,5 24,56 26,07 12,59  16,9
2004 12,3  7,6  -1,8   -0,8 27,94 29,65 13,29 13,1
  Source: Elaborated with data from BCU and INE. 
a/ Annual cumulative variation; b/ Percentage of GDP (current prices); c/ Urban areas  
 
Recent trends in the Uruguayan labour market 
 
In the nineties, the economic reforms carried out in Uruguay, along with increased trade 
openness and the creation of the MERCOSUR led to a restructuring process that 
determined changes in the composition of GDP as well as in the use of technology (Cassoni 
and Fachola, 1997; Croce, Macedo and Triunfo, 2000; Tansini and Triunfo, 1998a; 1998b). 
Between 1991 and 2002, the share of manufacturing employment was gradually reduced, 
from 21 percent to 13 percent of total urban employment
1. On the other hand, the share of 
services, especially in retail, restaurants, hotels and financial services, increased: these 
sectors, together with the construction sector, rose from 27.5 percent of total employment in 
1986 to 39 percent in 2002. This, in turn, drastically affected the Uruguayan labor market, 
displacing workers from some economic activities and changing the requirements of the 
work force.  
                                                  
1 In 2001 the share of manufacturing employment was 17%. Between 2001 and 2002 methodology to 
measure industry product was modified by the INE, so the fall in 2002 might be overvalued.     5
The following facts thus characterized the evolution of the Uruguayan labor market in the 
nineties: a) a generalized increase in labor productivity (output per worker); b) an increase in 
the unemployment rate associated with the destruction of unskilled jobs; c) an increase in 
wage dispersion, with a relative improvement of skilled wages; and d) an increase in 
informality. These trends have deepened in the current decade.  
 
Regarding the skill level of workers
2, data analysis shows that the unemployment rate is 
considerably lower for skilled workers, whereas unskilled workers show the highest 
unemployment rates. The unemployment rate in Uruguay climbed from 8.8 percent in 1991 
to 16.9 percent in 2002. Even prior to the severe economic crisis that affected Uruguay 
between 1998 and 2002, the unemployment rate showed an increasing trend in a context of 
economic growth. This evolution differed clearly according to the education level of the 
labour force.  
 
Another relevant change that occurred during the nineties was the reduction in public 
employment as a result of the ongoing state reform process. Public employment share in 
total employment fell from 24 percent in 1986 to 18 percent in 2002. However, public 
employment for skilled workers rose slightly during the same period. As a consequence, this 
structural change reinforced the effects of the changes observed in tradable sectors: greater 
destruction of unskilled jobs (UNDP, 2001)
 3.  
 
It should be noted that the changes in productive structure affected not only the quantity but 
also the quality of employment. Several studies suggest that precarious jobs, informality and 
underemployment increased throughout the decade, especially for workers with low 
education levels.
4 The destruction of low skilled jobs that took place both in the public sector 
and in the tradable sector drove unskilled workers towards employment in small productive 
units or self – employment, thus leading to an increase in precariousness and informality 
(UNDP, 2001; Bucheli, 2005). In this context, informality became one of the most important 
imperfections in the Uruguayan labour market, affecting more than one third of employed 
workers during this period. 
                                                  
2 This study considers that a worker is skilled if he has at least 12 years of formal education.  
3 In 1997-99, 22,400 unskilled and 5,600 skilled public jobs were destroyed. During the same period 
3,600 new skilled jobs were created. The outcome was the destruction of 24,400 public jobs.  
4 Precarious workers are those private dependent workers who are not covered by social security, 
have an unstable job, or receive no remuneration for their work. Informal workers are those not 
covered by social security. Underemployment comprises workers who work less than 40 hours a 
week but would be willing to work additional hours.     6
Methodology 
 
Labour market specification 
 
As cited in the previous section, the Uruguayan labour market presents serious problems of 
unemployment and informality. Therefore, we considered that these imperfections had to be 
captured in the model. However, we needed to focus on one type of imperfection. Since one 
of the distinguishing features of the Uruguayan labour market is the existence of a persistent 
wage differential between formal and informal jobs, a dual market labour approach was 
adopted for the study.  
 
The theory of dual labour markets is based on a two-tier regime where a primary and a 
secondary sector coexist with unemployment. Workers in the upper tier (primary sector) 
enjoy higher wages and fringe benefits; also, stability, union protection and labour regulation 
enforcement are more likely in this sector. Meanwhile, in the low wage (secondary) sector, 
the labour market clears and workers in this sector are not able to underbid those in the 
primary sector. A rationing of jobs in the primary sector explains the existence of queues and 
the persistence of unemployment. On the other hand, the secondary sector provides 
flexibility to the economy, adjusting its size to fluctuations in the business cycle. 
 
The efficiency wage model provides a microeconomic foundation for these features. 
Different versions propose a persistent wage gap and a negative relationship between the 
rate of unemployment and the upper tier wage (Saint Paul, 1996). In the Shapiro-Stiglitz 
version firms are interested in paying wages above the expected rates because of cost 
monitoring reasons (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The model assumes some inability of 
employers to observe workers effort. This allows the worker to choose how much effort he 
wants to make but if he shirks, he faces the probability of being fired. There is a critical wage 
above which the worker will not shirk. As far as firms are concerned, they compete by 
offering wage packages that take into account the minimum wage required to induce 
workers’ effort.  
 
In equilibrium, if wages are very high, workers will value their jobs not only by the high wage 
itself but also by the low level of employment (due to low labour demand at high wages). 
Among others reasons, the critical wage for non shirking will be greater; i) the lower the 
probability of being caught shirking; ii) the higher the expected utility of being unemployed   7
(e.g. the most generous the unemployment subsidy program) and iii) the higher the flows out 
of unemployment. 
 
The same results arise in versions based on “recruit, retain and motivate” reasons. On one 
hand, a high wage eases vacancies filling, reduces the quit rate and motivates effort. On the 
other hand, high unemployment affects the likelihood of finding a new job if dismissed (thus 
affecting effort) and the ease of voluntary turnover (quit).  
 
In the CGE model we assumed that an efficiency wage model might explain the wage gap 
between formal and informal workers. In order to estimate the wage gap, the study used the 
Continuous Household Survey (CHS) collected by the National Statistics Institute (INE) in 
2003. We restricted the sample to wage earners and self-employed workers between 18 and 
59 years of age. Informal workers are defined in this paper as those who do not contribute to 
the social security system. 
 
Different estimations of the wage gap were used in the simulation. First, we used a very 
simple econometric model: we regressed by ordinary least squares (OLQ) the log hourly 
wage on individual and labour characteristics, including a dummy variable that identified if 
the worker was formally employed.
5 The estimated dummy’ parameter (G1) is a measure of 
the wage gap. Then we used the usual way of decomposing wage differences, proposed by 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). The study estimated an earning equation for the formal 
workers and another one for informal workers. The difference of the characteristic’s rewards 
--weighted by the mean of the formal workers -- is interpreted as the mean wage gap (G2). 
Analogously, the study estimated the difference between coefficients but weighted by the 
average characteristics of informal workers (G3) 
 
This estimation ignores the endogeneity of the selection decision being formal or informal. 
We expect unobservable, individual characteristics to be correlated with being formal or 
informal (i.e. people with easy access to informal networks or to informal benefits could have 
more potential gains than being informal). To deal with this problem we estimated a 
switching regression model and used it to calculate the gap between the predicted wage of 
an average informal worker and the wage he would have had in the formal sector (G4).  
                                                  
5 We controlled personal characteristics (age, education, gender, marital status, geographical region), 
the type of occupation  (public servants, size of the establishment of the private wage earners, self-  8
The results of the estimations are shown in Appendix 1. We report the different estimations 
of the wage gap in Table 1. The four alternative estimations suggest that formal workers are 
highly remunerated.   
 
Table 2 
Estimated mean difference in earnings between formal and informal workers (log 
Wf-log Wi) 
Raw gap  0,85 






A CGE model that captures these conclusions is presented in the next section.  
 
The CGE model 
 
A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model was used to analyse the effects of several 
external shocks and some specific policies on the Uruguayan labour market,. It is based on 
the model by Laens and Terra (2000), with several changes regarding labour market 
behaviour, export demand and institutional design.  
 
The structure of the core CGE model is quite conventional in terms of the analysis of trade-
related issues, but an alternative specification is made regarding the labour market. We used 
two different versions of the model for the simulations: an efficiency wage
6 model and a 
competitive labour market model. 
 
The main features of this model are as follows: 
 
  It is a multi-sector model with 23 sectors, including two special sectors. One of the 
two special sectors gathers all the activities (mainly, public services and the financial 
sector) where employment and wages are fixed, because institutional arrangements 
and/or trade unions are a deterrent to workers’ dismissal or to wage reductions. By 
law, public employment is fixed: no new public employers are hired, and the existing 
                                                                                                                                                     
employed who own some property and self-employed who do not) and other labour characteristics 
(part-time and industry). 
6 Following Thierfelder, K.E., C.R. Shiells (1997) and Annabi, N. (2003)   9
ones cannot be fired. Although trade unions could have been introduced in the 
model, our intention was to focus on labour market duality between formal and 
informal workers. Trade union modelling might be included in a future specification of 
the model.   
 
  The other special sector is an informal sector that produces one type of good 
destined to domestic final consumption.  
 
  We assume that Uruguay has three trading partners (Argentina, Brazil and the rest of 
the world). The Uruguayan economy is explicitly modeled while in the case of the 
other trading partners only the supply of imports and the demand for exports are 
endogenous. 
 
  Perfect competition is assumed in all sectors. However, goods are not homogenous, 
as they are differentiated by geographic origin.  
 
  We assume that there are ten representative households which represent different 
income levels (by deciles of the income distribution).  
 
  Government collects tariffs and taxes. Government revenue is used to buy goods 
and services and to make transfers to households. We assume that government has 
fixed consumption of goods and services (in physical units) and the transfers to 
households are updated by the change in the average wage
7. Government savings is 
obtained as a residual.  
 
  On the production side, the study uses a nested production function. At the top level, 
firms combine intermediate inputs with value added following a Cobb-Douglas 
function. Value added is obtained with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function that combines capital and composite labour. Then, composite labour is 
obtained by combining skilled and unskilled labour with a CES. In the informal sector, 
value added is only composed by unskilled labour.  
 
                                                  
7 In 2001 social security transfers represented nearly 83 percent of total government transfers to 
households. In 1989 a constitutional reform measure established that social security benefits are 
adjusted to the evolution of Average Wage Index.    10
  Goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption (Armington). The small country 
assumption is made for imports, so the country faces a perfectly elastic supply curve 
in the external markets. However, it is assumed that the country faces a downward 
sloping demand curve for exports (quasi small open economy)
8. Export demand is a 
function of relative prices and real income in the trade partners, which are considered 
exogenous. 
 
  Total demand for each sector is composed by domestic demand (intermediate and 
final) plus exports to each of the trading partners. 
 
  Trade balance is fixed, so that imports and exports of goods and services maintain 
the difference existing in the benchmark data. The equilibrium in the model is defined 
by the simultaneous equilibrium in goods and factor markets and in the external 
sector.  
 
  There are three factors of production: capital, skilled, and unskilled labour (the labour 
market is segmented by qualifications). The supply of each factor is fixed and there is 
no international mobility. Skilled labour can only be employed in the formal sectors, 
while unskilled labour can also be employed in the informal sector.  
 
  In the model with efficiency wages, this behaviour is applied to all formal activities, 
except for those in the fixed employment sector, which we named APUBLIC, 
because it is mainly composed of public activities. Unemployment is fixed, so when 
unskilled workers are fired from the efficiency wage sectors, they go to the informal 
sector where they receive a lower wage. The specification of efficiency wage 
behaviour follows Thierfelder and Shiells (1997). 
 
The model was run using GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System). 
 
Calibration of the CGE model 
 
The model was calibrated using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) with data for the year 
2000. It was taken from Barrenechea, Katz and Pastori (2004). Originally, the SAM included 
                                                  
8 Following Cox’s specification (1994).    11
30 different activities and 36 different commodities. Even though this disaggregation was 
quite appropriate for this study, some adjustments had to be made.  
 
Specifically, it was necessary to show the differences in labour, according to the qualification 
of workers and their status of formality or informality. Therefore, labour was separated into 
skilled and unskilled labor. Among skilled workers, informality is not easily available, so it 
was assumed that skilled labour is always formal. Information about qualifications and 
formality of workers was taken from the 2003 Continuous Household Survey (CHS) collected 
by the National Statistics Institute (INE). Workers with twelve or more years of formal 
education were considered skilled workers.  
 
In order to study the labour market, it was also necessary to distinguish between private and 
public activities, because there are rigidities concerning both wages and employment in the 
public sector. Some activities, which are carried out by public and private agents (for 
example, education or electricity supply), needed to be decomposed. Therefore, a new 
activity was created that included all activities carried out by the public sector
9. This sector 
combines skilled and unskilled labour, such as those found in the private sector, but public 
employment is considered fixed. To separate public from private activities, information was 
also taken from the 2003 CHS.  
 
In addition, government final consumption was disaggregated in the new matrix. In the 
original SAM, government final consumption expenditure was included in a miscellaneous 
sector called “other services”. Final consumption expenditure of government was estimated 
from National Accounts. Then, final consumption expenditure was disaggregated according 
to the information provided by the 1995 SAM (Lorenzo, Osimani and Caputti, 1999; Laens 
and Terra, 2000).  
 
The rest of the world needed to be disaggregated as well. Argentina and Brazil were 
separated from the rest of the world, creating three foreign agents. In this case, data was 
taken from National Accounts and trade statistics from the Central Bank (BCU).  
 
Finally, an informal sector was created besides those originally considered in the SAM. It 
was assumed that the informal sector produces a composite good of all the activities in 
                                                  
9 That is: Electricity and Water Supply, Petroleum Refinery, Communications, Postal Service, 
Financial Services and Educational Services.    12
which informal labour was identified. This “informal good” is produced entirely for final 
consumption of households. It was assumed that value added of the informal sector includes 
only wages. The total amount of informal sector wages was estimated with data from the 
CHS. As a result, the informal sector includes activities such as agriculture and other primary 
activities, construction, retail, and textiles and clothing, which have an important component 
of informality.  
 
The microsimulations methodology 
 
The CGE model provides some insights about the poverty effects of the shocks and policies 
that were simulated. However, the combination of these results with a microsimulation 
methodology provides more precise information about poverty and income distribution by 
tracking the economy-wide changes at the household level. Several approaches have been 
developed with this purpose, as shown by Bourguignon, Pereira de Silva and Stern (2002).   
 
The microsimulations are based on household data but there is no need to reconcile this 
data with the SAM because the procedure only needs information about changes in wages, 
employment and unemployment. The method assumes that changes in the labour market 
can be replicated by a random selection procedure, which imposes counterfactual changes 
in labour market parameters calculated for the benchmark year. This approach follows Paes 
de Barros and Leite (1998), Paes de Barros (1999), Frenkel and González (2000), Ganuza 
et al (2002) and Ganuza et al (2004). It was applied for the case of Uruguay by Bucheli et al 
(2002) and by Laens and Perera (2004). The SPSS program used in this paper is the same 
one used in the latter work. 
 
The rationale for using microsimulations is that a CGE model captures only partial 
distribution of income between families, therefore making it difficult to see the real impact of 
shocks or public policies on income distribution and poverty. A crucial assumption adopted in 
this methodology is that a person’s position in the labour market is the main determinant of 
his income and poverty status.  
 
The procedure takes CGE results as inputs. Labour market structure is considered as a 
function of six parameters: participation rate, unemployment rate, wage structure, overall 
average wage, worker’s education level and structure of employment (sector of activity and 
occupation category). In this study, the participation rate is fixed, so it is not considered for   13
the microsimulations. In turn, sector of activity is defined in terms of formal or informal 
activity.   
 
Once the changes in the labour market parameters are obtained from the CGE results, the 
microsimulation methodology is applied. The procedure uses random numbers to simulate 
the changes in the labour market structure that are consistent with the parameters 
introduced. On average, the effect of the random changes will reflect the impact of the new 
(simulated) parameters in the labour market. The microsimulations are repeated a large 
number of times using Monte Carlo numbers to allow for the determination of confidence 
intervals for the poverty and income distribution indicators. In each simulation, changes in 
poverty and income distribution are measured through the percentage of population under 
the poverty line, the poverty gap, the Gini coefficient and the Theil coefficient. Data from 
CHS for the year 2000 was used.  
 
For each scenario, several changes in labour market structure were simulated, first 
separately, then sequentially. The idea behind establishing a sequence is that changes in 
labour parameters follow some order, which is not neutral. The commonly accepted 
sequence is the following: first the person decides whether to participate or not in the labour 
force; then the market decides whether he or she will be employed or not; then the person 
decides whether to work in the formal or formal sector and this determines a certain wage 
level and, in the aggregate, the average wage. Finally, labour market structure by education 
level is defined. This sequence was applied in the three models considered. As 
unemployment is fixed in the model, the corresponding rate remains unchanged. The 
analysis was made taking the whole sequence into account. 
 
 




In Section 2 we pointed out that increasing trade openness and the integration of the 
Uruguayan economy to the MERCOSUR augmented the country’s vulnerability to external 
shocks, particularly those originating in Argentina or Brazil. With that idea in mind, the study 
carried out some simulations in order to show how and why some of the forces at work 
during the 2002 crisis affected the Uruguayan labour market.    14
 
Again as explained in Section 2 the crisis had many components: recession in Argentina and 
Brazil, changes in relative prices that affected Uruguayan exports to those countries, credit 
constraints, financial turmoil, external debt growth, capital flight, etc. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to evaluate with our CGE the specific weight of each of these factors in the 
genesis and the deepening of the crisis, particularly because it had a very significant 
financial component, which cannot be tracked by this model.   
 
Nevertheless, we chose to simulate two relevant components of the 2002 crisis: the change 
in relative prices vis-à-vis the main trade partners (due to devaluations in those countries) 
and the foreign savings constraint. In order to assess the effects of the change in relative 
prices that occurred when Argentina abandoned the currency board regime, we simulated a 
40 percent decline in domestic prices nominated in dollars in Argentina and a 7 percent 
decrease in the price of imports from that origin (ARGRP scenario), which was what really 
happened in Argentina between 2000 and 2002
10. In order to compare the effects of the 
shocks originating in one or the other MERCOSUR partner, we simulated an identical 
change in prices in Brazil (BRARP).  
 
The third simulation was a restriction in foreign savings. In 2000 the Uruguayan current 
account was running a deficit, which was financed by capital inflow from the rest of the 
world. In 2002 the situation was reversed and no capital inflow was available, so a severe 
adjustment was needed to obtain a current account surplus. Therefore, in this simulation we 
fixed the current account balance (EXTSAV) at zero.  
 
As cited in Section 2, the MERCOSUR is an imperfect customs union because the common 
external tariff has not been fully enforced across the four countries. Its full enforcement was 
simulated in order to assess the effects that it might have on the Uruguayan labour market, 
especially because the rise in capital goods tariffs might have a negative effect due to a 
competitiveness loss (CET). 
 
Finally, we simulated a specific labour market policy. Assuming that a reduction in the 
relative cost of labour might improve employment, the study simulated a 10 percent direct 
subsidy on formal employment of unskilled labour (DIRTAX). 
   15
Table 3 summarizes the five experiments and shows how variables or exogenous 





The results of these five simulations with the CGE model are presented in Tables 4 
(Variation of main macroeconomic variables) and 5 (Effect on labour market variables). 
 
Simulations of regional shocks and results 
 
These experiments show the vulnerability of the Uruguayan economy to regional shocks, 
which have increased due to geography and the deepening of the integration process with 
the MERCOSUR countries. 
 
A change of relative prices in any of the MERCOSUR partners generates a GDP decline in 
Uruguay, a reduction of exports and imports, and a decrease in investment. The reduction of 
both exports and imports is due to our choice of model closure, which fixes current account 
balance. When export demand falls as a consequence of the relative price change with the 
trading partner, imports fall as well, and adjustment is done through the exchange rate, with 
a devaluation of local currency.  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
10 Data was taken from Indec- National Institute of Statistics and Censuses of Argentina.  
Simulation scenario Variable or exogenous parameters Variation (%)
ARGRP Domestic price index (DPARG i) -40%
Exports price from Argentina (PWARG i) -7%
BRARP Domestic price index (DPBR i) -40%
Exports price from Brazil (DPBR i)- 7 %
EXTSAV Current account balance (B) -100% *
CET Common external tariff (t)
DIRTAX Labour taxes (trab) -10%
* In benchmark the current account balance was 4% of GDP  16
Table 4 
 
The macroeconomic impact of the same change in relative prices is more pronounced when 
it happens in Argentina than when it happens in Brazil. This could be explained by the 
relative importance of exports to each country in the benchmark: 24 percent of total exports 
were destined for Argentina, 17 percent for Brazil and 59 percent for the rest of the world. In 
turn, the share of imports from those origins was 26 percent, 18 percent and 56 percent, 
respectively.  
 
This result should be taken with caution because it is not necessarily true that a shock 
coming from Brazil will always have lower effects on the Uruguayan economy than a shock 
from Argentina. This result is highly dependent on the prevailing macroeconomic conditions, 
as the region has been affected by severe instabilities that have significantly changed the 
trade composition by origin or destination. As long as Brazil increases its relative importance 
as trade partner for Uruguay, the impact of a relative price change in that country could 















Absortion* -0,38 -0,24 -4,42 -0,23 -0,03
Household Consumption* -0,14 -0,12 -0,66 -0,18 1,65
Investment* -2,24 -1,19 -31,32 -0,77 -10,00
Exports* -7,26 -2,79 9,97 -3,18 -0,44
Imports* -5,95 -2,04 -11,82 -2,54 -0,36
Real GDP -0,48 -0,33 -0,54 -0,29 -0,03
Real Exchange Rate 4,19 2,15 1,45 -0,36 -0,81
Export Price  -0,12 -0,09 0,00 0,00 0,00
I m p o r t  P r i c e - 2 , 9 6 - 2 , 4 40 , 0 00 , 0 00 , 0 0
Consumer Price 0,05 0,00 -0,25 0,09 -0,21
Absortion* -1,13 -0,30 -4,59 -0,22 0,20
Household Consumption* -0,28 -0,23 -0,58 -0,17 1,85
Investment* -7,38 -1,03 -33,13 -0,75 -9,39
Exports* -8,99 -4,62 10,25 -2,78 -0,34
Imports* -8,22 -4,27 -11,91 -2,14 -0,26
Real GDP -1,11 -0,27 -0,64 -0,29 0,19
Real Exchange Rate 4,37 2,57 1,57 -0,45 -0,60
Export Price  -0,40 -0,29 0,00 0,00 0,00
I m p o r t  P r i c e - 2 , 6 7 - 2 , 1 60 , 0 00 , 0 00 , 0 0
Consumer Price 0,04 0,03 -0,14 0,09 -0,17
Perfect competition model
Efficiency wage model
Macroeconomic variables for each simulation
Percent Variation  17
 
The impact of a relative price change in Argentina is higher when efficiency wages and the 
existence of an informal sector are assumed. In this case, real GDP falls by 1.1 percent, 
while it decreases 0.38 percent when the neoclassical assumptions are adopted. The 
variation of Argentine relative prices generates a very significant reduction of investment in 
Uruguay, which would reach 7.4 percent in the efficiency wage model and 2.2 percent in the 
perfect competition model. Investment declines because government savings decline (as 




On the other hand, a change of relative prices in Brazil has greater impact on the Uruguayan 
GDP when the perfect competition model is used. This could be explained by the factor 
intensity of goods traded, which is quite different from one country to the other. Trade flows 
with Argentina are more intensive in skilled labour than trade flows with Brazil (see tables 6 
and 7). Therefore, a competitiveness loss with Argentina generates a reallocation of 
resources towards industries that make intensive use of unskilled labour and capital (see 


















Informal Emp -0,48 0,21 0,48 -0,01 -4,97
Unskilled Emp 0,10 -0,04 -0,10 0,00 1,02
Unskilled Wage 0,34 -0,33 -1,14 -0,17 6,98
Skilled Wage -0,95 0,20 -0,33 -0,23 0,07
Informal Emp -0,28 0,19 0,37 0,02 -4,36
Unskilled Emp 0,12 -0,08 -0,16 -0,01 1,86
Wage Differential 0,16 -0,11 -0,21 -0,01 2,75
Unskilled Wage 0,00 -0,42 -0,94 -0,19 6,50
Skilled Wage -1,00 0,09 -0,23 -0,23 -2,76
Efficiency wage model
Labour Market Variables for each simulation
Percent Variation
Perfect competition model  18
Table 6 
Argentina Brazil Rest of the world
Skilled labour / 
Unskilled labour 0.68 0.30 0.37
Capital / Unskilled 
labour 0.94 1.47 1.82




ARG BRA RM ARG BRA RM ARG BRA RM
Agriculture & 
agroindustries
0.08 0.67 1 338 964 11.9 55.9 66.1 12.1 14.7 9.4
Other manuf. 
goods 0.37 1.33 -411 -330 -1289 25.8 34.7 17.6 63.7 73.1 70.6
Services 1.33 1.06 434 -24 -162 62.3 9.4 16.4 24.2 12.1 20.0
Total 1.00 1.00 23 -16 -487 100 100 100 100 100 100
Specialization and Factor Intensity by sector
% of Exports 
  Trade Balance      









The study assumes that the skilled labour market is perfectly competitive while the unskilled 
labour segment is subject to efficiency wages, so that an increase in demand for unskilled 
labour and a reallocation of resources to those sectors make the results differ more than in 
the case when the reallocation of resources operates in the opposite direction.  
 
In fact, when there are reasons for paying an efficiency wage, an inefficient resource 
allocation takes place. The production possibilities frontier shifts to the left when 
specialization becomes biased towards the production of goods intensive in unskilled labour. 
Therefore, the larger the specialization in goods intensive in unskilled labour, the greater the 
inefficiency generated by the existence of efficiency wages and the greater the difference in 
GDP in relation to an economy where the labour market is perfectly competitive.  




In order to simplify the problem, we can gather production in two big sectors according to 
their intensity in skilled or unskilled labour. The following graph illustrates the argument: 
 
The curve PPF1 is the production possibilities frontier when the labour market is perfectly 
competitive, while PPF2 shows the production possibilities frontier when there are efficiency 
wages in the unskilled labour market segment. Production possibilities are reduced more as 
production gets more specialized in goods that intensively make use of unskilled labour. P0 
PPF1 
PPF2 
Goods intensive in 
unskilled labour 
Goods intensive 
in skilled labour 
P0 
P’0 
P1  P’1 
AGRI MANUF SERV INFORMAL
Share of sector in 
total output 15,4 16,4 63,8 4,4
Perfect Comp 5,1 2,4 -0,8 -0,3
Efficiency Wage 6,1 1,5 -1,9 -0,2
Perfect Comp -2,9 -1,6 0,2 0,1
Efficiency Wage -3,6 -1,4 0,3 0
Perfect Comp 2,1 0,8 -1,5 0,5
Efficiency Wage 2,8 0,9 -1,8 0,3
P e r f e c t  C o m p - 0 , 6 1 , 2- 0 , 1- 0 , 1
Efficiency Wage -0,8 1 -0,2 0
Perfect Comp 2 0,3 -0,4 -2,3
Efficiency Wage 1,1 0,2 0 -1,9
External Savings Restriction
CET 
Subsidy to Unskilled labour
Output shares and variation by sector
Percentages
Argentina RP
Brazil RP  20
and P’0 show the best production combinations under perfect competition and under 
efficiency wages for the initial relative prices. The graph shows that as relative prices 
change, favoring an increase in the production of goods intensive in unskilled labour, the 
production combinations shift to P1 and P’1, respectively. It can be observed that P1’ is more 
distant from P1 than P0’ is from P0, due to the bias in the production possibilities frontier. This 
is because when employment increases in the efficiency wages sector, there is an efficiency 
loss due to an increase in the wage differential.  
 
Table 4 shows that the Argentine change in relative prices generates a very significant 
reduction in Uruguayan exports, which brings about an increase in specialization in goods 
intensive in unskilled labour (see table 7). In 2000, 62 percent of total exports to Argentina 
were services (tourism, financial services, transportation, etc.), many of them intensive in the 
use of skilled labour (especially, financial services).  
 
Table 5 shows the corresponding effects of these shocks on the labour market. In perfect 
competition, a change in relative prices with Argentina generates the opposite effect than the 
same change in Brazil: labour demand increases and so does the wage of unskilled labour, 
relative to skilled labour wage. A similar occurrence can be found in the version of the model 
with efficiency wages.  
 
The experiment that assumes an external savings restriction, due to the uncertainty 
prevailing in the region, generates a very significant decline in imports and investment, while 
there is an increase in exports. The effects on informal employment and wages are similar to 
those obtained in the case of a Brazilian change in relative prices, but their size is bigger. In 
this case, there is also a reallocation of resources towards the traditional exporting sectors, 
which are intensive in unskilled labour. Sectors like meat packing, dairy products, rice and 
other typical exporters, increase their unskilled labour demand by more than five percentage 
points. However, the reduction of investment brings about a 25 percent decrease in unskilled 
labour demand in construction as 75 percent of this sector’s output is destined for 
investment. This leads to a reduction in the service sector, but this reduction is concentrated 
to service sector activities that are intensive in unskilled labour. Therefore, unskilled labour 
demand falls, increasing informality. In addition, the external savings decline generates a fall 
in payments to all factors (see table 5).    21
 
Simulation of MERCOSUR deepening and results 
 
Simulating the full enforcement of the MERCOSUR CET implies an increase in protection in 
the Uruguayan domestic market, but its global impact is scarce (minimal?) (see table 4). 
Absorption, household consumption, trade and GDP fall, and this happens in the two 
versions of the model. There is a reallocation of resources towards the manufacturing sector 
(chemicals and other import substituting industries), leading to a more intensive use of 
capital. Anyway, the change in the production structure is slight. (see table 8). The increase 
in protection brings about an anti-export bias, so agriculture falls. Within services, the 
sectors that grow are commerce and transportation, but health services, hotels and gas 
distribution fall and so does other services.  
 
In the labour market a wage decrease is observed, mainly for skilled workers. In the 
efficiency wage model, there is an increase in informal employment (see table 5). Therefore, 
the CET approved by the MERCOSUR would not have a positive effect on employment in 
Uruguay: it would protect workers in the manufacturing sector (where employment 
increases) but would harm global employment.  
 
Impact of employment policies 
 
We tried to analyse the impact of some policies that could compensate for the negative 
effects on unskilled labour wages and informal workers, which were found in the previous 
simulations. To these ends, a 10 percent subsidy was simulated in the case of formal 
employment of unskilled workers (DIRTAX). The rationale for this type of policy stems from 
the existence of efficiency wages, which lead to lower employment of unskilled workers.  
 
This policy would have a low impact on absorption and trade, and would increase household 
consumption, but investment would fall (see table 4). Even though global income increases, 
savings do not increase in the same proportion because this policy favors lower income 
households: their income increases exponentially, but these households have lower 
propensity to save. On the other hand, the policy has a strong fiscal impact, as government 
expenditure and deficit increase. This explains the investment decline. Table 9 shows the 
evolution of income for every agent. In the poorest households income increases by 3   22
percent, while in the richest households, it only increases 0.5 percent. In turn, net 





In the perfect competition model, this policy has a negative effect on GDP due to its negative 
effects on efficiency and resource allocation, but it has a positive effect on GDP in the model 
with efficiency wages, because this policy tackles the core of the market imperfection: the 
demand for unskilled workers is below the optimum because there is a cost associated to 
monitoring, hiring and training such workers.   
 
In the labour market, a very significant increase in unskilled labour demand is observed, 
which is translated into higher employment of unskilled workers in the formal sector and a 
rise in their wage (see table 5). In perfect competition, the wage of unskilled workers rises by 
7 percent, while this rise is at 9.4 percent in the efficiency wage model. This is consistent 
with the informality decline of -2 percent in the efficiency wage case. In addition, these 
changes increase the relative wage of unskilled workers.  
 
Consequently, even though this type of policy seems appropriate in increasing efficiency and 
improving income distribution, when the efficiency wage hypothesis is valid, it may have 
perverse long run effects. This is so because investment falls, and there is also a 
disincentive to human capital accumulation. Both aspects might hinder economic growth in 
the long run. 
Perfect 
Competition Efficiency Wage
Household average 1,5 1,7
First decile 2,4 3
Second decile 2,6 3,1
Third decile 3,2 3,6
Fourth decile 2,6 2,9
Fifth decile 2,3 2,6
Sixth decile 2,3 2,6
Seventh decile 2,4 2,6
Eight decile 2,1 2,3
Nineth decile 1,2 1,3
Tenth decile 0,4 0,5
Government -5,9 -5,7
Income variation as a result of subsidy on unskilled labour
Percentages  23
 
Impact on income distribution and poverty 
 
In order to analyse the impact on poverty and income distribution of the shocks simulated 
with the CGE, we ran microsimulations for two cases: the external savings restriction 
(EXTSAV) and the subsidy to formal employment of unskilled labour (DIRTAX). In both 
cases the microsimulations were run based on the CGE results obtained from the two 
different versions of the model. We chose these two cases because these had the greatest 
impact on employment, informality and wages.  
 
For each microsimulation, changes in poverty are measured by two indicators: 1) the 
percentage of people under the poverty line; and 2) the poverty gap that shows the average 
distance between their income and the poverty line. Income distribution is measured with 
two well-known indicators: the Gini coefficient and the Theil coefficient. Table 10 shows the 
results obtained from these microsimulations. As can be observed, all the results are 





The restriction on external savings increases the share of the population below the poverty 
line and the inequality in income distribution, whereas a subsidy on unskilled labour 
employment in the formal sector has the opposite result. This is consistent with the changes 
in relative wages between skilled and unskilled labour found in the CGE results.  
 
In the efficiency wage model, a reduction in external savings leads to an increase in poverty: 
the population below the poverty line increases by 1.1 percent. In addition, income 
distribution deteriorates, as the Gini coefficient increases by 0.2 percent and the Theil 












Population below poverty line (P0) 17,8 1,9 -8,3 1,1 -7,7
Poverty gap (P1) 5,6 1 -9,5 1,3 -7,7
Gini coefficient 44,2 0,1 -1,4 0,2 -1,9
Theil coefficient 35,5 0,3 -2,8 0,7 -3,9
*All results are significant with a 95% confidence interval
Microsimulation results*
Perfect competition model Efficiency wage model
Percentage variations  24
coefficient by 0.7 percent. The results obtained with the perfect competition model are very 
similar.  
 
The microsimulations based on the CGE results for the subsidy on formal employment of 
unskilled labour show a positive impact on poverty and income distribution. The population 
below the poverty line declines - 8.3 percent in the perfect competition model and - 7.7 
percent in the case of the efficiency wage model.  Income distribution also improves, as the 
Gini coefficient is reduced by -1.4 and -1.9 percent, respectively. This might be explained by 
the significant rise of unskilled wage when this type of policy is implemented: in the efficiency 
wage model, unskilled wage rises 6.50 percent while the wage differential between formal 




The analysis of the Uruguayan labour market clearly shows the existence of wage 
differentials between sectors and labour categories. These differentials are wider between 
workers employed in the formal and in the informal sector, and between skilled and unskilled 
labour. These characteristics of the Uruguayan labour market indicate the need to 
incorporate labour market imperfections in the analysis of external shocks and trade policies 
using a CGE model. 
 
Minimum wage is not effective in Uruguay and labour unions are not strong enough to 
explain those differentials, except in a few activities, and mainly covering the public sector. 
Therefore, based on this evidence, the study assumed the existence of efficiency wage 
behaviour in the private formal sector.  
 
In this context, we constructed a CGE model in which we distinguished for kinds of workers. 
First, we made a distinction between skilled and unskilled workers. Second, we noted that 
there is a group of workers in a fixed employment sector, mainly the public sector. Then, as 
informality is not important for skilled workers, we considered that duality only affects 
unskilled workers. When unskilled workers are fired from the efficiency wage sectors, they 
go to the informal sector where they receive a lower wage. 
 
Different simulations were carried out with two versions of the CGE model: perfect 
competition and efficiency wage. In the second model it was assumed that the labour market   25
segment for skilled labour operates without distortions, while unskilled labour behaves in an 
efficiency wage mode. This assumption is reasonable, as both unemployment and 
informality are low for skilled labour. The perfect competition model was run as a reference. 
 
In the efficiency wage model, an extreme assumption was adopted concerning the 
displacement of unskilled workers. It was assumed that all displaced unskilled workers went 
to the informal sector. In fact, some of them remain unemployed.  
 
One clear conclusion from the simulations carried out in this study is that the MERCOSUR 
economies deeply affect the Uruguayan economy through changes in relative prices. The 
study shows that the same shocks on relative prices are more important for Uruguay when 
they originate in Argentina than when they occur in Brazil. However, this result should be 
taken cautiously because it is highly dependent on the composition of trade with each of 
those partners. In the benchmark year trade of goods and services was more important with 
Argentina, which explains the greater impact of shocks from that origin.  
 
Similarly, a restriction on external savings as a consequence of the instability in the region 
has significant effects on the Uruguayan labour market. On the contrary, the full enforcement 
of the common external tariff approved by the MERCOSUR does not have an impact of 
relevance.  
 
The first four simulations show the impact that macroeconomic instability in the region can 
have on the Uruguayan economy. Both the effect of changes in relative prices with Argentina 
and Brazil and an external savings restriction are significantly larger than a tariff change. The 
implementation of policies that tend to reduce the region’s share in total trade, such as the 
reduction of the CET, or free trade agreements with third markets (FTTA, EU-MERCOSUR 
agreement) is therefore important for Uruguay.  At the same time, one main objective of 
Uruguayan macroeconomic policy should be to avoid significant changes in relative prices 
with its main trading partners.  
 
The consideration of labour market imperfections is particularly important in cases where the 
simulations lead to a reallocation of resources towards sectors that use unskilled labour 
intensively. In this case, the increase in the wage premium implies an efficiency loss, which 
is larger in areas where the economy is more specialized, such as sectors intensive in 
unskilled labour.   26
The simulation of a subsidy on formal employment of unskilled workers shows that despite 
the increase in the wage premium, there is an increase in GDP due to the efficiency gain 
derived from the decline of informal employment or unemployment. The introduction of a 
subsidy stimulates demand for unskilled labour, thus compensating the demand reduction 
caused by the inefficiency derived from the wage premium. Even though this policy leads to 
an improvement in employment and income distribution, it generates a decline in investment 
and a disincentive to human capital accumulation, which could be harmful for growth in the 
long run.  
 
However, this kind of policy could still be implemented but should be more focused on 
specific workers, and with a lower tax rate. This way, adverse macroeconomic effects in the 
long run could be avoided, and informal, low productivity employment could be reduced. 
With this in mind, a more disaggregated CGE model can contribute in evaluating the impact 
of more focused policies in the future.  
 
Finally, the effects on poverty and income distribution obtained through microsimulations are 
consistent with the results of the CGE experiments, that a restriction in foreign savings has a 
negative effect on both. On the contrary, a policy that introduces a subsidy on formal 
employment of unskilled labour reduces the percentage of population under the poverty line 
and improves income distribution.  
 
The study results show the importance of taking into account the existence of imperfections 
in the labour market. The effects of external shocks, as well as the impact of some policies 
are clearly different in the presence of these imperfections. This fact emphasizes the need to 
make an appropriate diagnosis of the labour market when modeling the economy of a 
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Appendix 1 
Wage gap between formal and informal workers 
 
Even if there is no widely accepted and accurate definition of informality, the term is often 
used to refer to economic activities that are not illegal but avoid government regulations. 
From the labour perspective, workers are considered to be informal when they are not 
covered -- in practice -- by labour regulations. These regulations include the different 
aspects of labour legislation, taxation and the entitlement to certain benefits such as the paid 
sick leave or the retirement pension.  
 
Because of the broad set of aspects covered by labour regulations, it is necessary to choose 
an operational definition. For our purpose, workers are considered informal when they have 
a job but do not contribute to the social security system. This contribution is the only 
regulation that is mandatory to the whole labour force regardless of one’s occupation. In 
turn, the contribution entitles workers to receive a pension during retirement. Besides, the 
system provides other benefits -- less important in coverage and spending -- to some 
contributors during their working life e.g. health benefits, family allowances, pensions for the 
widow and children in case of death, among others. 
 
The data  
 
To estimate the wage gap between formal and informal workers, we used the Continuous 
Household Survey (CHS) collected by the National Statistics Institute (INE) in 2003. The 
CHS  is a survey carried out in urban areas that inquires about personal and labour 
characteristics (age, sex, marital status, schooling, hours of work, occupation, industry, etc.) 
and income received the preceding month classified by sources (wages, pensions, interest 
payments, etc).   
 
We restricted the sample to the wage earners and self-employed. This means that we 
excluded the following: people who work in a family enterprise without receiving pay, owners 
of firms (regardless of size), and members of cooperative units. These groups represent 
around 5 percent of the active population.  
 
We also limited the sample to workers of 18 to 59 years old, who represent 10 percent of the 
labour force. The bottom border was chosen because there are specific regulations for   30
workers younger than 18 years old (the minimum legal work age is 14). Regarding the top 
border, 60 years old is the minimum required retirement age.   
 
In order to classify a worker as formal or informal we used his status of contributor to the 
security system for reported information on his main occupation. Accordingly, we worked 
with data on the earnings and characteristics of the main job.  
 
The earnings were calculated as the sum of in-cash and in-kind monthly regular labour 
income divided by 4.2 (number of weeks in a month), and multiplied by the hours worked in 
the preceding week. The monthly regular labour income included: i) the regular earnings 
reported in the CHS; ii) the monthly in-the-job health benefits estimated by INE and cited in 
the CHS; iii) an estimation of the so-called thirteenth month wage; and iv) an estimation of a 
pecuniary benefit received during holidays.  
 
The thirteenth month wage is the right of private and public wage earners to receive an extra  
monthly wage equivalent during a year. The CHS reports the receipt of this benefit in the 
worker’s main job. Where a positive answer was given, we added an amount equivalent to 
1/12 of the reported monthly in-cash regular wage.  
 
Specifically for private sector wage earners, the law establishes a pecuniary benefit to be 
received during holidays. However, the CHS does not collect information about this benefit. 
To approximate this benefit, we added an amount equivalent to 1/18 of the reported monthly 
in-cash regular wage when the worker was a private wage earner and reported to receive a 
thirteenth month wage.  
 
We made different estimations of the wage gap between formal and informal workers.  
 
First, we used a very simple econometric model: we regressed by OLS the log hourly wage 
on individual and labour characteristics, including a dummy variable that identified if the 
worker was formally employed. Let W be the wage of a worker, X its observable 
characteristics and F a variable that has value1 when the worker is formal (contributes to the 
social security system): 
 
() ε β + + = F G X W 1 ln 1    31
The estimated ‘dummy’ parameter G1 reflects the wage gap between formal and informal 
workers.  
 
Next, we used the usual way of decomposing wage differences proposed by Oaxaca (1973) 
and Blinder (1973). We divided the sample into two sub-samples, one of formal workers and 
another of informal workers, and an earning equation was estimated for each one. Let W be 
the wage of a worker, X its observable characteristics and f,i two sub-indices that denote 
formality and informality respectively:  
 
()
() i i X i i W









We assume that εj (j=i, f) is an error term with a normal distribution with zero-mean and we 
estimate both equations by OLS. Denoting the mean of the variables with a bar and making 
some calculations, we can decompose the raw gap between sectors as: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i f f i i f i f i f i f i f X X X X X X W W β β β β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ln ln 4
' ' ' ' − + − = − + − = −  
The last of the components reflects the wage difference that is not explained by independent 
variables but by the coefficients of the earnings equations. This may be interpreted as the 
wage gap valuated in the mean of the formal worker’s characteristics. An analogous 
decomposition allows estimating the wage gap as the difference between coefficients but 
weighted by the average characteristics of informal workers thus: 
( )













This estimation ignores the endogeneity of the selection decision of being formal or informal. 
We expect unobservable individual characteristics to be correlated with being either formal 
or informal (i.e. people with easy access to informal networks or to informal benefits could 
have more potential gains in being informal). One strategy to deal with this kind of a problem 
consists of estimating a switching regression model.  
 
A latent variable F* defines a variable F that takes value 1 when the worker is formal and 0 
when he is informal. The variable F* depends on two different types of characteristics: those 
that affect the level of earnings and hence the choice of being formal or informal (X) and   32







The disturbances η are potentially correlated with  ωi and ωf. We assume that they have a 
trivariate normal distribution and we do a joint estimation using the full-information 
maximum-likelihood method. The wage gap between formal and informal workers is 
estimated by calculating the predicted difference in earnings. Similar to the OLS estimations, 
we estimate the two gaps thus:  
()
















The results of the earning equation proposed in equation (1) are reported in column (A) of 
Table 1. We controlled personal characteristics (age, education, gender, marital status, 
geographical region), the type of occupation  (public servants, size of the establishment of 
the private wage earners, self-employed who own some property and self-employed who do 
not and other labour characteristics (part-time and industry). In columns (B) and (C) we 
report the results of the estimation of equations (2) and (3). Finally, the results of the 
switching regression model estimations appear in the last columns. The signs of the effect of 
the usual explanatory variables included in the earning equation are expected: labour 
income increases with education, rises with age at decreasing rates and is higher for married 
people and for men.  
 
We report the predicted difference in earnings in Table 2. The five alternative estimations 
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Table 1. Results of regression estimates  




















0,592          
Formal  (41.63)**          
0,163 0,07  0,182  0,263  0,093  0,162 
6 to 8 years of schooling  (6.49)** (2.37)*  (5.12)**  (29.62)**  (19.76)** (31.67)** 
0,294 0,212  0,296  0,563  0,256  0,247 
9 to 11 years of schooling  (11.07)** (6.98)**  (7.39)**  (60.39)**  (52.92)**  (42.64)** 
0,446 0,379  0,421  0,811  0,434  0,343 
12 years of schooling  (16.47)** (12.31)**  (9.84)**  (84.04)**  (88.70)**  (52.96)** 
0,662 0,56  0,788  0,977  0,626  0,689 
Tertiary level incomplete  (21.35)** (16.51)**  (12.33)**  (78.10)**  (116.85)** (75.02)** 
0,902 0,805  1,118  1.601  0,894  0,925 
Tertiary level complete   (30.54)** (24.59)**  (13.28)**  (127.72)**  (170.94)** (75.36)** 
0,051 0,059  0,048  0,055  0,063  0,043 
Age  (14.93)** (16.46)**  (7.68)**  (39.09)**  (110.35)** (46.43)** 
-0,05 -0,057 -0,053  -0,044  -0,061 -0,048 
Age squared (/100)  (11.54)** (12.50)**  (6.36)**  (24.75)**  (85.66)**  (40.83)** 
0,119 0,093  0,149  0,22  0,108  0,125 
Civil status (Married=1)  (11.28)** (8.33)**  (7.33)**  (38.10)**  (61.73)**  (39.91)** 
-0,217 -0,209  -0,243  0,038  -0,209  -0,247 
Gender (Female=1)  (20.14)** (19.06)**  (9.94)**  (6.93)**  (125.31)** (70.99)** 
-0,06 -0,127 0,016  0,234  -0,115 -0,005 
Agriculture  (2.11)* (3.67)** -0,35  (23.80)**  (23.99)**  -0,68 
0,352 0,262  -0,19  0,542  0,276  -0,296 
Electricity, water & gas  (9.79)** (7.35)**  -0,42  (8.80)**  (41.80)** (3.17)** 
0,128 0,037  0,194  -0,312  0,011  0,206 
Construction  (4.85)** -1,36  (4.81)**  (30.42)**  (2.16)*  (34.97)** 
-0,055 -0,068  -0,011  0,254  -0,05  -0,034 
Commerce  (3.32)** (3.96)**  -0,35  (39.83)**  (17.29)** (7.26)** 
0,076 0,055  0,025  0,395  0,079  -0,026 
Transport  (3.38)** (2.46)*  -0,44  (40.92)**  (22.12)** (3.23)** 
0,241 0,234  0,163  0,556  0,273  0,101 
Finance (10.37)**  (9.27)**  (3.37)** (62.69)**  (80.96)**  (14.17)** 
0,102 0,007  0,248  0,084  0,018  0,24 
Services (6.08)**  -0,39  (7.53)** (12.19)**  (6.27)**  (48.38)** 
0,416 0,395  0,427  -0,863  0,334  0,504  Part time (less than 30 
hours=1) (28.03)**  (20.86)**  (20.12)** (163.92)**  (120.11)**  (129.86)** 
0,209 0,169  0,271  0,196  0,181  0,251  Region 
(Montevideo=1) (21.09)**  (16.30)**  (13.83)**  (47.65)**  (111.85)**  (84.36)** 
0,231 -0,007 0,167  3.382  0,32  -0,29 
Public servant  (8.09)**  -0,1  -1,49  (258.43)**  (33.93)**  (13.65)** 
0,137 -0,08  0,129  0,7  0,052  0,094 
Self-employed with property (4.88)**  -1,09 (3.92)**  (72.13)** (6.40)**  (20.92)** 
0,117 -0,21  0,132  1.352  -0,034  0,032  Private micro-enterprise (< 
5) (4.56)**  (2.95)**  (4.46)**  (141.40)**  (4.03)**  (5.95)** 
0,163 -0,163 0,25  1.865  0,084  0,08 
Private little enterprise (5-9)  (5.76)**  (2.29)* (6.45)** (178.31)**  (9.43)**  (9.74)** 
0,289 0,027  0,231  2.619  0,33  -0,067 
Private other size (>9)  (10.73)**  -0,38 (5.84)**  (271.86)**  (36.27)**  (6.01)** 
     0,022    
Household head         (3.37)**     
     0,031    
Household head’s spouse        (3.82)**     
     0,058     School attendance 
(attendance=1)      (6.33)**     
     -0,306      Retirement pension 
(recipient =1)        (31.14)**     
     -10
4 x 4.7     
Household income (log)        (-0.53)     
1,057 1,87  1,068  -3,613  1,362  1,219 
Constant (15.24)**  (18.91)**  (9.09)** (123.27)**  (84.85)**  (67.54)** 
Observations 17767  11450  6317       
R-squared 0,48  0,4  0,23      
* Denotes significance at 5%; ** denotes significance at 1%; *** Correlations: η and ωf = 0,41314*; η and ωI = -0,30800*   34
Table 2.  Estimated mean difference in earnings between formal and informal workers 
(log Wf – log Wi) 
Raw gap  0,85 




G4 0,52   35




  The equations of the CGE model are presented in this appendix. Three versions of 
the model were specified: perfect competition in the labour market, efficiency wages for non 
skilled workers, and the wage curve. Lower fonts indicate endogenous variables, capital 
fonts refer to exogenous variables, and Greek letters indicate parameters. The subscripts i, j 
refer to sectors, the subscripts z, t refer to geographic zones and the subscripts f refer to 
representative households grouped according to income levels as follows: 
i, j = {1, 2, …, J}  
z = Uruguay (u), Argentina (a), Brazil (b), rest of the world (r) 





Demand functions are derived from a Cobb Douglas utility function which is an 
increasing function of consumption of composite goods that combines different varieties of 
differentiated goods. In turn, the sub-utility functions follow an Armington specification (1969) 
in perfect competition sectors. In the perfectly competitive sectors, goods are differentiated 
by geographic origin. 
  Consumers maximize a Cobb Douglas utility function subject to their budget 






) 1 )( 1 (
.
− −
= μ        (1)  
where cif   is the demand for a composite final good i (differentiated by geographic origin),  Yf  
is total income of a representative household f in Uruguay, tdf  is direct tax rate, msavf  is 
marginal propensity to save, and pfi is the composite price index. This index can be written 
as:  
()















= ∑   ,          ( 2)  
being  λzi the share parameter in the Armington function, Фi the elasticity of substitution 
between goods from different origin, and pzi the market price of good i from market z.    36
Investment demand of good i is a fixed share of total investment: 
 
        (3)   
I being total investment. 
Final demand of a differentiated good i produced in country z by a representative 



















=        (4)  
where dzih   is the final domestic demand of the ia<institution f.  















− =          (5)  
where eiz is the demand for a variety of the differentiated good i in market z, piz is the export 
price from Uruguay, pdzi is the domestic price index of good i in market z, R is the real 
income of the partner z, ER is the exchange rate, and eoiz  is a parameter. 
 
Production  
  Each sector combines primary factors and intermediate inputs following a Cobb-
Douglas production function. The value added is a nested CES production function 
combining skilled labour, unskilled labour, and capital.  
 
 Cost 
Total variable cost is derived from a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale 
production function. The variable unit cost is:  
() () ∏ ∑ + =
−
j
ji i i i i
ji
j
ji vi tind vc v
α α ω . 1
1       ( 6 )      
where vi is the variable unit cost, vci is the value added cost and viij is the composite price of 
intermediate inputs. αij is the distribution parameter of a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
and ϖi is a parameter.   
  Value added is a combination of labor and capital specified as a CES. Thus, vci  is: 
() [ ]
) 1 /( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( . . 1
i i i i i
i i i i w r vc
σ σ σ σ σ δ δ
− − − + − =      (7)  




c μ =  37
parameters of the CES function for value added, while σi is  the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour.  
As the model considers two types of labour, the average wage is a combination of 
skilled and unskilled wage. It is assumed that skilled and unskilled labours are combined 
following a CES function, so the average wage is:  
() ( ) []
) 1 /( 1 1 1 . . . 1 .
1 i
i i i i
i i i
i
li ws wd wu w
θ θ θ θ θ ξ ξ
ϕ
− − − + − =      (8)  
where wli is the average wage, wu y wsi are the unskilled and the skilled wage, respectively, 
ξ y ϕ are the distribution and scale parameters, and θi is the elasticity of substitution between 
skilled and unskilled labour.  
The efficiency wage is endogenous. It is assumed that the workers caught from 
(What do you mean by this?) the efficiency wages sectors go to the informal sector, where 
the labour market is competitive and wage premiums are absent. To model the efficiency 
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    (9) 
where κ is the utility of shirking, rd is the discount rate, D! is the probability that no-
shirking workers will be falsely accused and fired from the efficiency wage sector, D2 is the 
probability to be caught shirking and therefore fired, S is the rate of quitting the efficiency 
wage sector. Other specifications of the model do not consider situations when a worker is 
fired from the efficiency wage sector and remains unemployed. The estimation of the wage 
curve will be used to calibrate the parameters.  
The intermediate inputs are differentiated by geographic origin with an Armington 
formulation. The composite price of intermediates is: 
()















= ∑                (10)  
where pzj is the price in the local market of input j used in sector i from each zone, γzji is the 
CES distribution parameter, and φj is the elasticity of substitution between goods from 
different origins.  
 
Input and factor demand by firm   38
  Firms maximize their profits so demand for intermediate inputs and value added 


























       ( 1 1 )    
where xzji is the demand for input j coming from country z and used by sector i for each firm 
in sector i. It is a decreasing function of the input price. 
Valued added demand is a decreasing function of the value added cost and 
increasing function of the unitary cost and output in each sector: 
() i i
i






α        ( 1 2 )  
  Factor demand is a decreasing function of their return rate and is an increasing 
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=       (15) 
 
Domestic pricing 
In the perfect competitive sectors, the equilibrium price of output is equal to its 
variable unit cost (vi ):  
() i i ui tex v p + = 1     when i= competitive sectors    ( 16)  
where the lower case “u” refers to Uruguay. The firms charge the same price in domestic 
and foreign markets.  
 
General Equilibrium 
Public services fix prices, wages, and employment whereas production level and 
capital demand is endogenous.  
Income of the households is endogenous and is the sum of the returns to factors of 
production and transfers from the government:    39
lg ). . . ( wg tr f r k w l y f i i i
i
i i f + + + + =∑      (17) 
Government income is the sum of the receipts of tariff collection, indirect taxes and 
profits from public firms:  
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Government expenditure is the sum of household transfers, public wages and 
government consumption: 
lg wg p d tr GE zi zig
f
f ∑ ∑ + + =       ( 1 9 )  
where GE is the government expenditure, d is the government consumption of good I, which 
is a fixed coefficient, wg is the public wage and lg is public employment, both fixed. 
Government savings is the difference between government income and expenditure: 
GE y SG G − =         ( 2 0 )  
and assumed to be constant.  
The equilibrium conditions in the labour market are: 
i i i i n fs ls LS . + =         (21) 
where LSi is the supply of skilled labour and 
∑ + =
i
i i i n fu lu LU ) . (         (22) 
where LU is the supply of unskilled labour. Both variables are exogenous. 
  The equilibrium equation for capital is: 
i i i i n fk k K . + =          (23) 
where Ki is capital supply (exogenous). 
  When factors are assumed to be sector specific there is one equilibrium condition for 
each factor and sector, but when factors are assumed perfectly mobile there is only one 
equation for each factor.  
The equilibrium conditions in the goods market require that supply equals demand in 
each sector: 
∑∑ + + =
jt
it uij ui i e x d q         (24) 
Finally, the external equilibrium is: 
  B p x n p d ER p e tj
it i jt
tji ui ZI ti
it
ui it = − −∑∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ . . .     (25) 
In all the simulations B is fixed in terms of the numerary. 